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Introduction: The Esoteric Name of Psychoanalysis 
It is striking that Freud invents two neologisms simultaneously: psychoanalysis and 
metapsychology. In a paper originally written in French, ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the 
Neuroses’, Freud uses the term ‘psychoanalysis’ for the first time: 
 
I owe my results to a new method of psycho-analysis, Josef Breuer’s exploratory 
procedure; it is a little intricate, but it is irreplaceable, so fertile has it shown itself 
to be in throwing light upon the obscure paths of unconscious ideation. (Freud, 
1896a, p. 151) 
 
This paper was sent off to the Revue Neurologique on 5 February 1896. Eight days later, 
in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud created the word ‘metapsychology’: ‘I am continually 
occupied with psychology – really metapsychology’ (Masson, 1985, p. 172). 
 Here is ‘psychoanalysis’ intended for a scientific publication, ‘metapsychology’ used 
in the secrecy of a private correspondence, as if metapsychology was at first the other name, 
the esoteric name of psychoanalysis. The interdependence between a method – the practice of 
psychoanalysis – and a set of concepts – metapsychology – exists in Freud’s work since their 
birth, but what remains unclear is the exact nature of this link. In other words, what was the 
function of metapsychology in Freud’s psychoanalytical practice?  
 Referring to the problems raised by the clinic of hysteria, Freud wrote: ‘You see that 
the remainder of the problem lies once more in the field of psychology – and, what is more, a 
psychology of a kind for which philosophers have done little to prepare the way for us’ 
(Freud, 1896b, p. 219). In fact, metapsychology was for Freud this field of research in which 
he could problematize conventional assumptions about the psychology of his neurotic 
patients. He pursued this research throughout his life, in the process giving birth to different 
models of the functioning of psychic life. 
  Each evolution of Freud’s metapsychology raised debates and controversies within 
the psychoanalytic movement. Even the very project to build a psychology of the 
unconscious was challenged early on, notably by Eric Fromm (1947) and Karen Horney 
(1937), who tried to apprehend the psyche not as an apparatus but rather through its 
potentiality to form social relationships. The way some analysts proposed to replace a 
psychological approach with a cultural one is a rich field of investigation when it comes to 
the vicissitudes of Freud’s reception in the United States. However, it is one that I will leave 
aside in this paper since the controversy I am researching here is of a more epistemological 
kind. It stemmed from a new generation of American psychoanalysts who through the 1970s 
and 1980s questioned the legitimacy of Freud’s metapsychological knowledge. I propose to 
explore the rejection of metapsychology by this generation of American analysts and suggest 
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that their aim was to transform psychoanalysis into a purely rational form of knowledge. I 
will also look at some of the reactions that these American polemics triggered, notably from 
respondents who pointed to the central importance of metapsychology in relation to the 
clinic.  
 The 1970s–1980s controversy over Freud’s metapsychology took place in the wider 
context of epistemological debates on the status of human science in the United States. In his 
book Working Knowledge, Joel Isaac identifies the different epistemological models through 
which human sciences have sought to legitimize the production of knowledge since World 
War II. He describes a first, positivist phase that goes from after the war to 1962, during 
which human sciences aspire to reproduce the causal explanatory models of natural sciences, 
followed by a second, hermeneutic phase that puts at its core the understanding of subjective 
meanings (Isaac, 2012, pp. 9–10). This paper explores the way in which a generation of 
psychoanalysts, trained and for the most part born in the United States, raised in their turn the 
problem of legitimizing psychoanalytic knowledge, and how the core of this endeavour 
revolved, for them, around Freud’s metapsychology. I show here that in their epistemological 
reflections, the actors of the metapsychological controversy reproduced the two main models 
described by Isaac and grouped themselves around positivist and hermeneutic views. In 
confronting the scientific legitimacy of metapsychology, these analysts from the New World 
help us retrospectively to understand the nature of this old Freudian theoretical project.   
 
‘The Maidservant of Psychiatry’: Metapsychology and Its Discontents 
Freud was highly suspicious of the future of psychoanalysis in the United States. In one of his 
last letters to Theodor Reik, about the issue of lay analysis, he wrote that for American 
analysts, ‘analysis is nothing else but one of the maidservants of psychiatry’ (Gay, 2006, p. 
633). Freud felt that in the United States psychoanalysis was not considered an autonomous 
field of knowledge, but had to be absorbed into another mainstream practice. I think that it 
was such a motivation – finding a theoretical womb for psychoanalysis – that pushed a series 
of American analysts to attack Freud’s metapsychology in the 1970s. These analysts were 
trying to ‘understand, clarify, and put to work the psychoanalytic theory of thinking’ (Holt, 
2009, p. vii). In other words, they were attempting to discover new epistemological 
foundations for psychoanalysis. Though the results of these attempts gave birth to various 
models, they all started their endeavours with a complete rejection of Freud’s 
metapsychology.  
 This challenge to Freud’s metapsychology was in fact part of a more general turn 
against classical ego psychology. When the American critics questioned metapsychology, 
they were studying it in the form that they had received it: which was mainly through Heinz 
Hartmann. From 1940 to 1960, Hartmann and Anna Freud were indeed the two most 
influential Freudian theorists in the United States (Ellman, 2010, p. 169). Through the US 
publication of Anna Freud’s The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence in 1946 and 
Hartmann’s Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation in 1958, a certain reading of 
Freud’s structural model was spread in which knowledge of the unconscious was gained 
through the mediation of the preconscious and conscious aspects of the ego. A striking 
example of the fact that what was being evaluated was an ego psychology version of 
metapsychology is that these critics retained nothing of the death drive but aggression. 
Hence, it is important to understand the definition of metapsychology given by classical ego 
psychology. 
 Hartmann thought of psychoanalysis as a natural science that was ‘moving in the 
direction of becoming a general theory of human behavior’ (Hartmann, 1964b, p. 12). He 
perceived this as essential in order to bridge psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. 
Hartman did not raise the question of the role played by metapsychology in the evolution of 
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Freud’s thought but treated it as a set of given concepts that he tried to make as easily 
digestible as possible for the science and social science of his time. As he wrote, his aim was 
to balance the ‘rationalism of enlightenment and the irrationalism of the romantics’ 
(Hartmann, 1964a, p. 9). Within the psychoanalytic scientific edifice, he viewed 
metapsychology not as metatheory but as ‘theory on the highest level of abstraction’ (p. 328). 
Hartmann’s approach expressed a desire to establish a hierarchical classification of 
psychoanalytic propositions, which would constitute one of the epistemological obsessions of 
ego psychology and a foundational anchor for the critics of metapsychology.  
 In their groundbreaking paper, ‘The Points of View and Assumptions of 
Metapsychology’ published in 1959, David Rapaport and Merton Gill proposed such a 
classification with an ascending order of generalization: empirical propositions, general 
psychoanalytic propositions and metapsychological propositions.1 Freud had defined a 
metapsychological presentation as a description of a psychical process ‘in its dynamic, 
topographical and economic aspects’ (Freud, 1915c, p. 181). For Rapaport and Gill, 
metapsychological propositions include the dynamic point of view, the economic point of 
view, the structural point of view, and additionally the genetic point of view and the adaptive 
point of view. 
 With this paper, Rapaport and Gill signed a form of manifesto for an ego 
psychological understanding of metapsychology, and this manifesto had two main 
consequences. First, they rejected the topographical point of view in favour of the structural 
point of view. Second, they added genetic and adaptive dimensions in order to redefine 
metapsychology within the framework of psychoanalysis understood as a natural science. It is 
precisely the recognition that such an attempt would lead to a dead end, and that ‘Freudian 
natural-science metapsychology is a serious obstacle to the development of psychoanalysis’ 
(Gill, 1988, p. 46), that would eventually push Gill to change his view and to reframe 
metapsychology within ‘a self-contained hermeneutic’ model of psychoanalysis. 
 Another attempt to classify psychoanalytic propositions was made by Robert Waelder 
in his 1962 paper, ‘Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy’. Waelder 
distinguished six degrees of relevance in Freud’s doctrine, from the most important to the less 
important: the level of observation, the level of clinical interpretation, the level of clinical 
generalizations, the level of clinical theory, the level of metapsychology and finally the level 
of Freud’s philosophy. It is worth noting that unconscious mental processes are classified by 
Waelder not at the level of metapsychology but at the level of clinical observation. 
 The way these analysts, oriented towards ego psychology, established a hierarchy of 
Freud’s corpus in fact prepared the ground for the general attack on metapsychology, because 
with such classifications they transmitted two types of prejudice. The first consisted in 
approaching Freud ahistorically, as if Freud’s concepts had appeared in one go as a ready-
made organized system. A closer chronological reading of Freud shows that his theory was a 
constant work in progress and, moreover, that in this work in progress metapsychology 
played a very particular role. In fact, it could be argued that metapsychology does not aim to 
be a coherent system but a space of creativity that at times follows and at times guides the 
clinical work. 
 The second prejudice was to force on Freud’s theory a type of hierarchy borrowed 
from natural science. In this hierarchy, the main authors from ego psychology proposed that 
metapsychology was the most speculative part of Freud’s theory. Many analysts would cling 
 
1. Like Hartmann, Rapaport attempted to make psychoanalysis a general psychology. Through his work at the 
Menninger Foundation, he mentored many of the researchers like George Klein, Roy Schafer, Merton M. Gill 
and Robert R. Holt who eventually rebelled against Freud’s metapsychology.  
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to this definition in their criticisms. Thus, Frank (1979) understood metapsychology as the 
metatheory of psychoanalysis and Arlow defined it as ‘a priori assumptions beyond 
hypotheses derivable within the clinical setting’ (Arlow, 1975, p. 517). Freud, however, 
never presented such a hierarchical edifice of knowledge, but rather developed his own 
peculiar epistemological framework. According to Vannina Micheli-Rechtman, even ‘more 
than the unconscious in itself, the radical novelty was in Freud’s eyes the whole intellectual 
endeavour that led to this discovery’ (Micheli-Rechtman, 2010, p. 29, my translation).  
 In The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis (Freud, 1925[1924]a), Freud returned to the 
motives behind the hostility triggered towards psychoanalysis, which he had touched on 
earlier in A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis (1917b). He stressed the peculiarity of 
the psychoanalytic epistemological framework, which succumbs completely neither to the 
mechanistic approach of the natural scientist, nor to the speculative one of the philosopher. It 
maintains a difficult middle position between perception and speculation, between clinical 
fact and philosophical concept. Freud predicted that psychoanalysis would derive  
 
nothing but disadvantages from its middle position between medicine and 
philosophy. Doctors regard it as a speculative system and refuse to believe that, like 
every other natural science, it is based on a patient and tireless elaboration of facts 
from the world of perception; philosophers, measuring it by the standard of their 
own artificially constructed systems, find that it starts from impossible premises and 
reproach it because its most general concepts (which are only now in process of 
evolution) lack clarity and precision. (Freud, 1925[1924]a, p. 217) 
 
One other important premise for the critics of metapsychology can be traced to Lawrence 
Kubie’s article ‘The Fallacious Use of Quantitative Concepts in Dynamic Psychology’. In 
this paper published in 1947, Kubie argued that Freud’s economic principle holds a special 
fascination due to its pseudo-scientific aspect. But because the quantitative changes of 
individual energy components are impossible to measure in a clinical observation, the use of 
economic quantitative terms was, according to Kubie, ‘the weakest element in all current 
theories of psychological causation’ (Kubie, 1947, p. 518). 
 In Kubie’s article the word ‘metapsychology’ never appears. However, two elements 
in it will have a strong influence on what I identify as the two main currents of the American 
critique of Freudian epistemology. The first will be developed through the positivist criticism 
of metapsychology: it is Kubie’s attack on the psychic energy model. Indeed, most of the 
criticism will be addressed to the economic point of view, and to the idea that Freud’s 
concern with psychic energy is a scientific anachronism. Kubie argued that Freud’s economic 
metaphor was a convenient way of covering over the difficulties of psychodynamic 
causation, while evading the task of finding methods to quantify such processes. Kubie’s 
refusal to attribute any metaphorical possibilities to Freud’s texts can appear somewhat naive. 
Yet, this demand for measurable parameters will be at the centre of the positivist critique. In 
his introduction to a new translation of Freud’s metapsychological papers, Mark Cousins 
rightly linked this demand with the development of quantitative data in psychological 
research (Cousins, 2005). 
 The second element will be at the core of the hermeneutic critique: it is the way Kubie 
distinguishes between description and explanation in science. Kubie’s thesis is that the use of 
non-measurable quantitative concepts to explain psychological phenomena is fallacious 
because it rests on the delusion that ‘we have explained a phenomenon which we have merely 
described in metaphors’ (Kubie, 1947, p. 508). 
 This distinction between explanatory and descriptive scientific methods is rooted in the 
‘dispute on method’ (Methodenstreit) that took place at the end of the nineteenth century in 
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German-speaking universities. The debate, which started amongst economists, erupted into 
the broader field of academic knowledge with the publication in 1883 of Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
Introduction to the Human Sciences. Dilthey’s aim was to give human sciences an 
epistemological status that would be both as scientific as the natural sciences and independent 
of them. This led to an epistemic split which, as noticed by De Robertis, is still unresolved 
more than 150 years later (De Robertis, 2001, p. 134).  
 On the one side, we have a form of knowledge developed by natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften), with a nomothetic approach, which explains (erklären) its objects 
from the outside by establishing universal laws out of experimental facts using ‘causal’ 
categories. On the other side stands a form of knowledge developed by human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften]) with an idiographic approach, which attempts to understand 
(verstehen) its objects from the inside, describing their singularities using the categories of 
‘aim’ and ‘meaning’. I will show how the hermeneutic critics – particularly via the distinction 
between the ‘how-question’ and ‘why-question’ (Klein, 1973; Schafer 1975) – will reopen 
the ‘dispute on method’ at the heart of Freud’s metapsychology by identifying it as a relic of 
Freud’s scientism and proposing to replace this explanatory discourse with a descriptive one. 
Noticeably, Heinz Kohut in The Restoration of the Self (1977) developed a similar view: he 
accepted any innovations when it came to descriptive theory but believed that a crisis of the 
explanatory theory had arrived. 
 To summarize, the two premises shared by classical ego psychologists were: 
 
1. Psychoanalysis is a natural science. 
2. It is necessary to ‘synchronize’ Freud’s work in order to remove speculation from 
theory. 
 
The idea, put forward notably by Hartmann, that psychoanalysis is composed of two theories 
– a clinical and a speculative one – would provide a rock to stand on for the critics of 
metapsychology.  
 Both the proponents of positivism and those of hermeneutics shared a reading of 
metapsychology as a model that offers mechanistic explanations. The difference between 
them was that the upholders of hermeneutics aimed to refute metapsychology as non-analytic 
and to replace it by another fundamental theory, while the supporters of positivism wanted to 
translate the metapsychological hypothesis into one that could be empirically testable. This 
distinction matches the one made by Modell who, in his 1981 article ‘Does Metapsychology 
Still Exist?’, distinguished the attacks against metapsychology that attempt to modify it 
because it is no longer congruent with observation (the positivist view) from those that 
understand it as a completely irrelevant discourse (the hermeneutic view). These two lines of 
thought somehow confirm Freud’s fear about the future of psychoanalysis in the United 
States, as psychoanalysis finds itself threatened with being assimilated into psychology on the 
one side and into biology on the other. 
 In what follows, I will first consider in more detail the views of three of the most 
representative analysts who critiqued Freud’s metapsychology from a hermeneutic angle: 
George S. Klein, Roy Schafer and Merton M. Gill. Afterwards, I will turn to the arguments of 
the positivists.  
 
The Hermeneutic Point of View: A Return to Phenomenology? 
George Klein 
In the story of this controversy, the first unambiguous call for the rejection of 
metapsychology was made by George Klein in 1973 with the publication of ‘Is 
Psychoanalysis Relevant?’. Klein distinguished two theories in Freud: two lines of 
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development that ‘express different conceptions of what psychoanalysis is and ought to be’ 
and whose ‘more profound point of distinction is that they derive from two different 
philosophies of inquiry and explanation’ (Klein, 1973, pp. 9–10). One theory rests on clinical 
explanation and its aim is the reading of intentionality. It tries to decipher the meaning of 
‘behavior, experience, testimony […] as jointly exemplifying directive “tensions”, avowed, 
disavowed, repressed, defended’ (p. 10). 
  The second side of psychoanalytic theory is metapsychology, which Klein perceived 
as an approach in which ‘the terms of explanation have nothing to do with the subject’s own 
vantage point; it is the person observed as a physical process that is the main objective’ (p. 
12). Klein argued that these two lines are incompatible because the former describes the 
intentionality of the subject, whereas the latter rejects the very notion of a psychological 
subject. The coexistence of these two paradigms leads, therefore, to a form of confusion that 
blurs the distinction between mechanistic drive and subjective motivation.2  
 According to Klein, it is the clinical orientation towards explanation that is most 
characteristic of psychoanalysis, because it informs an exchange in which the analyst 
searches for a depth intentionality in the patient’s experience, which they aim to 
communicate to the patient through meaningful interpretations. Klein proposed that ‘to get to 
the core assumptions of clinical psychoanalysis […] surgery is necessary – a theorectomy’, 
that would separate clinical from metapsychological notions, ‘so as to free the irreplaceable 
core concepts of clinical psychoanalytic theory’ (p. 9). 
 Stripped of its mechanistic line of explanation, Klein described psychoanalytic theory 
more as a humanistic discipline than a natural science, and he compared the role of the 
analyst to ‘the historian’s obligation of narrative construction’ or ‘the playwright’s 
responsibility for depicting a logic of motivation’ (p. 13). In his 1976 paper, ‘Freud’s Two 
Theories of Sexuality, Psychology versus Metapsychology’, Klein further developed this 
logic of motivation as a replacement for metapsychology. He proposed that motivations are 
the results of experiences perceived by a person during the course of their development. This 
theory of motivation is in fact articulated through the developmental psychological concepts 
of experience and behaviour in order to integrate psychoanalysis into psychology. In Klein’s 
model, psychoanalysis would be a part of psychology that provides an adequate language for 
the description of the subject’s depth intentionality. 
 Throughout his work, George Klein was looking for a conception of intentionality 
that could be transcribed into conscious modes of thought. From this angle, a neurotic 
symptom is perceived as a meaningful solution found by the subject to face the demand 
raised by several conflictual intentional ideas. These conflictual ideas belong to the same 
category of representations produced by the same conscious mode of thinking. Klein never 
considered intentional contents that would not be subjugated to consciousness. He put 
forward a vision of the psychological subject as a self-present subject: a subject that could 
ideally think itself in its entirety.  
 More than a cure, the setting for the classical psychoanalytic treatment becomes a 
means for human observation, a sort of psychological laboratory. Consequently, one 
understands George Klein’s rejection of Freud’s metapsychology, since metapsychology puts 
forward a form of intentionality that resists being transcribed into the language of 
 
2. In Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (1970[1965]), Paul Ricoeur likewise distinguished two 
levels of discourse in Freud’s theory: on the one side, a metapsychological explanatory level that rests on 
conflictual forces and a circulation of energy, and on the other, an interpretative level that rests on the deciphering 
of latent meanings. Unlike many analysts defending a hermeneutic perspective, Ricoeur justified the duality in 
Freud’s theory and argued that this correlation between forces and meaning is a consequence of the singularity of 
the objects studied by psychoanalysis (Ricoeur, 1970[1965], p. 75). 
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consciousness and which deconstructs the notion of a psychological subject. Moreover, far 
from revealing to the analysand the depth of their intentionality, or the most intimate secrets 
of their being, Freud’s metapsychology makes possible a cure that constructs a form of 
radical otherness in the self. Clinically, it creates a form of intimacy that remains irreducible 
to consciousness or to the ego. 
 Instead of Freud’s dynamic unconscious, Klein proposed a sort of phenomenological 
unconscious made of non-accepted or even non-socialized experiences. One of the most 
striking aspects of this shift is the replacement of sexuality by sensuality; thus he speaks of 
‘the theory of infantile sensuality’ (1973, p. 4). The sexual energy of the drive is replaced by 
the experience of sensuality, whose source is not a pressing and puzzling demand, but a quest 
for an adaptive goal with a clear meaning.  
 
Roy Schafer 
In 1976, Roy Schafer presented himself as being in the forefront of ‘a new critical movement 
concerned with the logic, language, implications and applications of Freudian 
psychoanalysis’ (Schafer, 1976, p. x). Indeed, the work of Schafer appears to be one of the 
most original amongst the American critics of metapsychology. This is probably due to the 
fact that his views are strongly influenced by analytical philosophy, which unlike continental 
philosophy has for the most part not directly engaged with psychoanalysis, although there are 
of course some important exceptions. A main characteristic of analytical philosophy is to 
investigate the way in which reality is formulated linguistically (Laugier & Plaud, 2011, p. 
13). Schafer’s critique of metapsychology was therefore addressed at the level of its 
language, which fails to deal with meanings or the singularity of subjective experience. 
Schafer’s verdict is irrevocable: ‘It is time to stop using the mixed physicochemical and 
biological language of Freudian metapsychology’ (Schafer, 1975, p. 41). 
 Following Wittgenstein, Schafer understood the notion of language as ‘a set of rules 
for saying things of the sort that constitute or communicate a version of reality or a world’ 
(1975, p. 42). Schafer wanted to replace metapsychology by another language: first, because 
in his view it is not conceptually rigorous and systematic enough, and, second, because its 
language borrowed from natural science eliminates the subject. Schafer thought that the 
subject excluded by the scientific aspect of metapsychology returns through the 
anthropomorphic aspect of its language. Moreover, this anthropomorphic language takes an 
infantile form and the language of metapsychology seems to reproduce the archaic body of 
infancy: ‘notions of internal, external, boundaries, thresholds, damming up and discharging: 
all these and many others may be viewed as psychosexual body language inappropriately 
elevated to the status of theoretical terms’ (p. 42).  
 This last criticism had been already developed by Home who accused Freud’s 
metapsychology of having applied metaphors to meaning, and of understanding those 
metaphors literally: metapsychology ‘reifies the concept of mind and elaborates a scientific 
type theory in terms of causes. To reify is to deify, for reification creates the ideal immortal 
object by the simple process of definition, just as personification in the era of humanism 
created the immortal gods’ (Home, 1966, p. 47). 
 This suppression of the subject puts metapsychology in contradiction with what 
Schafer understood as the essence of psychoanalysis: to make the subject the agent of its 
actions. On that aspect, Gilbert Diatkine (1985, p. 1219) pointed out the influence of Sartre 
on the way Schafer defined the aim of the analytical cure. In order for psychoanalysis to 
rediscover what Schafer understood as its true nature, an alternative language is necessary. 
From 1972 onwards, with his paper ‘Internalization: Process or Fantasy’ and through his 
book published in 1976, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, Roy Schafer would literally 
devise this new language that he named ‘action language’.  
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 To create this alternative language, Schafer used ideas from the main philosophical 
currents of the twentieth century. His key influence is to be found in the part of analytic 
philosophy called philosophy of mind inaugurated by Wittgenstein’s later writings, but he 
also took concepts from existentialism – notably his use of Sartre’s concept of ‘bad faith’ 
(Schafer, 1976, p. 235) – and phenomenology. Action language is defined as an attempt to 
stress the transformative significance of psychoanalytic interpretation through 
 
its bringing home to the analysand the extent to which, and the terms in which, he has 
been the author of his own life, unconsciously and preconsciously as well as 
consciously, and the extent to which and the terms in which he has been disclaiming 
this activity. (Schafer, 1975, p. 44) 
 
Hence, action language is developed as a feature of psychoanalysis understood as a practice 
of interpretation: a hermeneutic language to replace Freud’s metapsychological language. 
The fundamental rule of the action language is to regard all psychological processes, events, 
phenomena or behaviour as actions. The only human phenomena that are not classified as 
actions by Schafer are bodily changes because, according to him, ‘they are devoid of 
symbolic content’ (Schafer, 1973, p. 178).  
 Because, in his view, the psychoanalytic cure dealt only with actions, to speak of 
mental processes one should replace the use of nouns and adjectives by active verbs and 
adverbs. Schafer banished the use of the passive form from his action language. Moreover, he 
recommended that analysts no longer refer to location, movement or direction and never 
mention quantity. The topographical, dynamic and energetic points of view were therefore 
eliminated. In the same way, ‘we shall not speak of internalization except in the sense of a 
person’s imagining his incorporating something’ (Schafer, 1975, p. 45). The main 
psychodynamic concepts such as drive, impulse or psychic energy were likewise excluded 
from action language and the ‘id’ is emptied of all content and limited to an adverbial usage 
(p. 47). Similarly, the systems conscious, preconscious and unconscious were replaced by 
three descriptive ‘modes of actions’. Whether a psychological process is conscious or 
unconscious becomes a secondary matter. 
 Many articles have been written to refute Schafer’s proposals (Wurmser, 1977; 
Barratt, 1978; Meissner, 1979; Anscombe, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1984; Diatkine, 1985). From 
these criticisms I have extracted four points that I find the most relevant for my study: 
 
1. Action language suppresses the difference between doing and saying. 
2. In Schafer’s view, the aim of psychoanalysis is reduced to making the subject 
responsible for his actions. 
3. His idea of creating a sort of Orwellian Newspeak devoid of any unconscious 
phantasy that would avoid any misunderstanding seems an illusion. Moreover, such a 
language could be experienced as persecutory by the analysand. 
4. The unconscious becomes secondary as a qualifier of mental processes. From this 
angle, Schafer’s action language appears to be a pre-psychoanalytic formulation. 
 
At stake in the effort to replace Freud’s metapsychology by ‘action language’ is an attempt to 
reintroduce a subjectivity in which meanings are transparent and immediately available to 
consciousness. As with George Klein, who replaced the drive theory with a phenomenology 
of motivations, I understand Schafer’s work as an attempt to replace a psychology of the 




The importance of Gill’s criticism comes from his theoretical shift: he moved from being 
Hartmann’s close colleague – and redefining an ego psychology reading of 
metapsychological points of view in collaboration with Rappaport (Rapaport & Gill, 1959) – 
to supporting George Klein’s notion that ‘metapsychology is irrelevant to psychoanalysis’ 
(Gill, 1975). He actually carried Klein’s argument one step further by stating that 
metapsychology is not psychology at all but provides ‘explanations which are only 
pseudoscientific apings of natural science’, and that psychoanalysis, on the other hand, ‘needs 
to develop in its own terms as a self-contained hermeneutic science’ to which the usual 
canons of empirical research could be applied (Gill, 1988, p. 46).  
 Gill stood up against the idea that renouncing metapsychology would be an 
‘abandonment of the fact that a human being is a biological organism as well as a person’, 
because according to him, ‘psychoanalysis deals with biology as it is psychologically 
experienced, not in somatic terms’ (p. 46). Gill set out with great clarity the premises and the 
reasoning at work in the hermeneutic assault on metapsychology. This rests on the argument 
that the object of psychoanalysis would not be the biological reality of the mind but the way 
this biological reality is subjectively experienced. Psychoanalytic theory would then be a 
descriptive and interpretative discourse of these subjective experiences. 
 Metapsychology is thus reduced to being an unnecessary explanatory discourse. The 
supporters of the hermeneutic view never consider a reading of metapsychology as a more 
abstract way to describe the psyche in the context of the analytical encounter itself. The 
unconscious is identified in a limited way as the intentional contents expelled from 
consciousness. In other words, they refuse Freud’s dynamic unconscious and so ignore the 
problem raised by the description of intentional ideas that cannot be apprehended by 
consciousness. Moreover, in this hermeneutic model of psychoanalysis, every subjective 
experience can be transcribed into empirical variables. Subjective experiences manifest 
themselves in the purity of self-presence to consciousness, and the cure aims to describe this 
phenomenology of intentionality so that the subject would regain a form of control over it. 
 
The Positivist Point of View: Lost in Translation? 
The positivist criticism of metapsychology originated from a different line of reasoning. 
Unlike the supporters of a hermeneutic epistemological status for psychoanalysis, the 
positivist point of view retained the idea of metapsychology as a set of ‘theoretical 
assumptions on which a psychoanalytic system could be founded’. The positivist attacks 
against Freud’s metapsychology were directed rather against its speculative aspect, and the 
project became one of linking metapsychology with a method whose scientific nature would 
be guaranteed by empiricism and the Popperian principle of falsifiability. Hence, the main 
endeavour of the positivists was to find correlations between metapsychological concepts and 
testable hypotheses: in other words, an exercise of translation. This translation follows two 
steps. The first is to identify what the observable phenomena in psychoanalysis are; the 
second consists in generalizing this data into a scientific theory. 
 I distinguish two broad trends amongst positivist critics. The first proposes a new 
scientific theory to generalize the observable data. This view is exemplified in the work of 
Emmanuel Peterfreund. The second conserves metapsychology as a generalizing theory with 
the condition that it follows the rules of empiricism: a metapsychology that has given up 
speculation and introspection. I will examine this second approach through Charles Brenner. 
 
Emmanuel Peterfreund 
Emmanuel Peterfreund believed that the aim of psychoanalytic research was to establish 
generalizations about the phenomena under observation. Unconscious phenomena are not 
observable but ‘patients have experiences – sensations, feelings, images, fantasies, thoughts, 
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and so on – which can be thought of as the raw data of psycho-analysis, the phenomena of 
observation’ (Peterfreund, 1975, p. 534). Peterfreund proposed that in ‘all sciences there are 
high-level theories which use terms that are quite abstract and remote from observable 
phenomena’ (p. 535) and he defined metapsychology as the language in which the high-level, 
abstract psychoanalytic theory is expressed. 
 Peterfreund argued that Freud’s metapsychology was based on a pre-Freudian view of 
man that depended on two fundamental untenable assumptions: first, the idea that the mind is 
separate from the body, and second, that the mind is unique to humans. This Cartesian, pre-
Darwinian outlook makes Freud’s metapsychology unacceptable as a paradigm. Hence, 
Peterfreund argues for a change of paradigm in order to ‘use the most advanced creations of 
the human mind to attempt to explain the mind itself’, and as a new paradigm, he proposed: 
‘information processing and a systems model which is consistent with neurophysiology’ (p. 
547). Peterfreund understood psychological experience as the input and feedback of 
information, and psychical conflicts were to be conceptualized using ‘a complex 
hierarchically arranged, branching tree of contingent situations’ (p. 539). Rather than the 
expression of a psychic conflict, neurosis would be a mistake in the programming of the 
mind. In Peterfreund’s information theory model, the dynamic unconscious has literally 
disappeared and has been replaced by a descriptive unconscious that operates more like a 
computer – a sort of program that reprogrammes information.  
 
Charles Brenner 
At first glance, Brenner offered a trenchant criticism of the hermeneutic reading of 
metapsychology. He explained that the separation between a concrete level of psychoanalytic 
theory that is supported by clinical data and an abstract, unproved and unprovable level rested 
on a misconception of knowledge formation, since there is no such thing as a neutral 
observation: in ‘every branch of science even the simplest observations involve ideas of the 
highest order of abstraction’ (Brenner, 1980, p. 200). Brenner was opposed to the view that 
psychoanalysis is a science of meaning, and argued that it was a branch of natural science 
since ‘mental phenomena are an aspect of brain functioning, it follows that psychology and 
psychoanalysis are necessarily a branch of biology’ (p. 206).  
 Brenner explained that the data of every branch of science are unique, but that they all 
share a common endeavour to find cause-and-effect relationships with respect to their data: 
‘Science is, in any case, adjectival, not nominal. It is not what one observes that defines 
science: it is the attitude one brings to one’s observations and how one deals with them’ (p. 
206). Thus, if indeed psychoanalysis deals with meanings as data, it would nevertheless be 
fallacious to conclude that it is a science of meanings. Brenner’s epistemological subtlety was 
to point out that the types of meanings gathered by the psychoanalytic encounter constituted a 
new category of data that was unknown before Freud. Freud’s discovery of free association 
as ‘the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis’ (Freud, 1911–1915[1914], p. 107) would 
represent the discovery of a technique that generated a new category of objects: wishes, fears, 
fantasies, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and associative material expressed in language and 
gestures. In Brenner’s view, the clinic becomes a technique, a sort of laboratory for 
discovering the human psyche. 
 According to Brenner, these new objects of knowledge should be studied through the 
method that is shared by all natural sciences: observation, formulation of generalizations and 
the most rigorous testing of these hypothetical generalizations. In this epistemological model, 
Brenner understood Freud’s metapsychology as synonymous with ‘psychoanalytic 
psychology’: a psychology of unconscious mental processes. As long as this ‘psychoanalytic 
psychology’ has available data of observation, Brenner thought that metapsychology could be 
used as a generalizing theory.  
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 I have proposed that the positivist criticism was always a form of translation. In 
Brenner’s case it would be a kind of tautological translation: metapsychology is translated by 
metapsychology. However, from Freud’s to Brenner’s metapsychology there is an obvious 
loss in translation, since Brenner completely disregarded the idea that introspection, or any 
form of speculation, could be a research method in psychoanalysis. Brenner acknowledged 
the novelty of free association as a method of observation, but never considered that 
metapsychology could be the manifestation of this method of free association in the 
construction of a theory: that is, he refused to see any links between free association and 
metapsychology. 
 Brenner’s refusal to give any role to introspection in metapsychology and his 
‘sacralization’ of clinical data pushed him to refocus the theory around the expression of the 
patient’s conflicts. In his introduction to Psychoanalysis: The Science of Mental Conflict – a 
series of essays in honour of Charles Brenner – Arnold D. Richards notices that this 
‘sensitivity to the experiential specificity of the analysand’s conflicting wishes’ led Brenner 
to ‘adopt a position of nominal agreement’ with the stance of hermeneuticists like Klein and 
Schafer (Richards, 1986, p. 9). Richards points out the ‘essential difference’, though: that 
‘Brenner arrives at his position using the language and conceptual framework of classical 
analysis’, whereas Klein and Schafer ‘feel they can articulate the singularity of the 
individual’s conflicts and wishes […] with a new vocabulary and a new conceptual 
framework’ (p. 9).  
 
‘The Witch Metapsychology’: A Third Perspective on the Debate 
In what follows, I want to return to Freud’s work in order to highlight aspects of the 
metapsychology that were either overlooked, misperceived or rejected in this first wave of 
American critical debates in the 1970s–1980s, before finishing with a brief view of some of 
the counterstatements they provoked. At the beginning of Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 
Freud wrote a kind of epistemological manifesto that I find especially relevant in this 
discussion, since, on the one hand, it anticipates Brenner’s critique of a neutral observation of 
meanings, but on the other hand, it also points towards a theory of knowledge that would take 
introspection into account: 
 
Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract 
ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other but certainly 
not from observations alone. Such ideas – which will later become the basic 
concepts of the science – are still more indispensable as the material is further 
worked over. They must at first necessarily possess some degree of indefiniteness; 
there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their content. So long as they 
remain in this condition, we come to an understanding about their meaning by 
making repeated references to the material of observation from which they appear 
to have been derived, but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. (Freud, 
1915a, p. 117) 
 
Freud writes that metapsychological ideas are not derived from ‘observations alone’ but from 
‘somewhere or other’. What could this ‘somewhere or other’ be? Freud would give an answer 
to this in one of the last psychoanalytic texts to be published in his lifetime: ‘Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable’ (1937). In this text that denotes a certain pessimism, Freud 
questioned the therapeutic efficacy of the analytical cure. In the third section, he explained 
that when it comes to the treatment of severe cases of illness, the decisive factor in achieving 
any success is a taming of the drives. ‘If we are asked by what methods and means this result 
is achieved,’ wrote Freud, ‘it is not easy to find an answer. We can only say: “So muss denn 
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doch die Hexe dran!” – the Witch Meta-psychology. Without metapsychological speculation 
and theorizing – I had almost said “phantasying” – we shall not get another step forward’ 
(Freud, 1937, p. 225).  
 The implication follows that, when clinical work reaches its limits, the only way to 
progress is through metapsychology, even if this progression is fraught with pitfalls, for 
‘what our Witch reveals is neither very clear nor very detailed’ (p. 225). Hence, the 
‘somewhere or other’ from which metapsychological ideas are derived is speculation, 
theorizing and even phantasying. The hypotheses provided by metapsychology form a kind of 
mythology borne out of Freud’s theoretical speculations, from Freud’s phantasies. 
 Freud had already articulated this idea in an exchange of letters with Albert Einstein 
published under the title Why War?: ‘It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories are a 
kind of mythology and, in the present case, not even an agreeable one. But does not every 
science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this? Cannot the same be said today of 
your own Physics?’ (Freud, 1933, p. 211). Paul-Laurent Assoun has noticed how, in Freud’s 
metapsychological texts, the shifts from Oedipus to Narcissus and then to Thanatos involve a 
growing use of ‘phantasying’ (Assoun, 2009, p. 81). One of the main peculiarities of Freud’s 
model consists in the epistemological value of such an act of ‘phantasying’ at the core of a 
theory of the human psyche. 
 To this point we can add a further observation, which has to do with the way 
dimensions of ‘theatricality’ and metaphor, embedded in the language of Freud’s 
metapsychological works, were ironed out of the texts on which the American debate based 
itself. Unlike the founders of ego psychology, the analysts who undertook the critique of 
Freud’s metapsychology trained in America and read Freud primarily in English through 
James Strachey’s translations in the Standard Edition. According to Riccardo Steiner, these 
had been encouraged in the direction of ‘scientificity’, partly under the influence of Ernest 
Jones, in order to add medical credibility to psychoanalysis. Jones presented Freud as a 
‘Darwin of the mind, who has replaced the metaphysical or poetical phrases of 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Shaw, by a scientific and biological one’ (Steiner, 1987, 
p. 53). Reading Strachey’s translation, one therefore encounters a Freud coloured with a 
positivist light. 
 Freud’s German metapsychology did in fact contain many terms inspired by a Greek 
or a Latin terminology.3 Therefore the metapsychological texts seem more in accord with the 
premises guiding the Standard Edition than other parts of Freud’s work. However, I would 
argue that Freud is here using the language of science in a metaphorical way. In giving an 
account of unconscious processes, scientific language functions like a scenography. As 
Friedman and Alexander put it, Freud ‘both preserves and overthrows the language of 
naturalistic sciences’ (Friedman & Alexander, 1983, p. 304). This metaphorical aspect is 
more evident in German, and to explain this point it is useful to come back to Freud’s 1915 
definition of metapsychology: 
 
I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its 
dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a 
metapsychological presentation. (Freud, 1915c, p. 181)</EXT> 
 
In the Gesammelte Werke, Freud writes: 
 
3. In a non-exhaustive list that comes from the one established by Emmet Wilson (1987, p. 304), one finds in 
these works such non-Germanic words as Objekt, Libido, Erogenität, Introversion, Mechanismus, Apparat, 




Ich schlage vor, daß es eine metapsychologische Darstellung genannt werden 
soll, wenn es uns gelingt, einen psychischen Vorgang nach seinen dynamischen, 
topischen und ökonomischen Beziehungen zu beschreiben. (Freud, 1991[1915], 
p. 281) 
  
Strachey translated ‘eine metapsychologische Darstellung’ as ‘a metapsychological 
presentation’. Usually Strachey uses the word ‘presentation’ to translate ‘Vorstellung’ and 
‘Darstellung’ for ‘account’ or ‘representation’. But as Joyce Crick explains in the 
introduction of her translation of The Interpretation of Dreams, Vorstellung and Darstellung 
mean representation in quite different senses: Vorstellung indicates the image or the idea of 
an act of thought, whereas Darstellung ‘consists of disguises, substitutions, and stand-ins’ for 
the thought (Freud, 1999, p. xlv). In his translation of The Unconscious for The New Penguin 
Freud, Graham Frankland (2005) renders the same phrase as ‘a metapsychological account’. 
My hypothesis is that Strachey chose to translate Darstellung as ‘presentation’ at this point 
rather than ‘representation’ in order to reinforce the idea that the mechanistic language used 
by Freud was not metaphorical. I read Darstellung as an indication that metapsychology is a 
more deviant form of representation. 
 Darstellung is a word for which many translations have been proposed. 
‘Presentification’ was coined by Monique David-Ménard (1989[1983]) to describe how an 
unconscious idea is performed through a hysterical symptom. Riccardo Steiner mentions that 
Ernest Jones had proposed to translate Darstellung with ‘dramatisation’ (Steiner, 1987, p. 
79). Botella and Botella chose to use ‘figurability’ as a translation of Darstellbarkeit in order 
to emphasize that the psychic work of representability is similar to a process of translation: a 
process ‘of “clarifying”, and of sending out on reconnaissance to explore an unknown terrain’ 
(Botella & Botella, 2005[2001], p. 2). 
 All these translations give an idea of Darstellung as a theatrical representation of 
thought.4 In Chapter 7 of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud takes over Fechner’s 
hypothesis that ‘the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life’ 
(Freud, 1942[1900], p. 536) and he explains that it is such a scene of the dream that reveals 
the hallucinatory mode of functioning of unconscious processes. When Freud describes how 
an unconscious memory attracts thoughts onto this hallucinatory stage, it is the term 
Darstellung that he uses.  
 Thoughts connected with an unconscious memory are drawn into a mode of 
dramatization characteristic of the unconscious; similarly, in order to theorize the 
unconscious, I am proposing that Freud’s metapsychology ‘dramatizes’ the language of 
science. The term Darstellung is, at any rate, central to the definition of metapsychology, and 
its translation into ‘presentation’ prepared the American critics of the 1970s for a too literal 
reception of the texts and contributed to their sense that metapsychology was based on 
anachronistic scientific knowledge that had to be replaced by more contemporary theories.  
 
The Supporters of Metapsychology: ‘Psycho-analysis farà da se’ 
In a letter to Jung dated 30 November 1911, Freud protested against the idea that 
psychoanalysis should be subordinate to another discipline: ‘What troubles me most is that 
Fräulein Spielrein wants to subordinate the psychological material to biological 
 
4. It is also worth noticing that Darsteller means ‘actor’. When in a hysterical symptom or in a dream, an 
unconscious thought is represented – or one could say ‘performed’ – I believe Freud used Darstellung to stress 
the ‘theatricality’ of this representation. 
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considerations; this dependency is no more acceptable than a dependency on philosophy, 
physiology, or brain anatomy. ΨA farà da se’ (McGuire, 1974, p. 469). There have been 
diverse responses to the American criticisms; however, it seems to me that they all support 
the right of psychoanalysis to have its own epistemological structure and not to become 
subordinate either to a general psychology or to biology. This is well embodied by Arnold 
Modell’s refusal to abandon a metapsychological approach because ‘psychoanalysis cannot 
be fitted into ready made epistemology’ (Modell, 1981, p. 400).  
 In a similar fashion, Leon Wurmser conceived of psychoanalysis as an autonomous 
field of knowledge of symbolic forms that could be reduced neither to the natural sciences 
nor to the humanities: ‘Psychoanalysis is a symbolic form of theoretical knowledge sui 
generis and sui iuris: of independent origins, nature, lawfulness, criteria of validity, and 
structure of theory’ (Wurmser, 1977, p. 495). Moreover, he supported the idea of 
metapsychology as a metaphor. Many articles have stressed the central place of metaphor in 
clinical work: Arlow (1969), Caruth and Ekstein (1966), Lewin (1970), Sharpe (1940), Voth 
(1970), to name a few. Wurmser’s originality was to study the place of metaphor from an 
epistemological viewpoint, focusing on the role it played in the formation and formulation of 
psychoanalytic theory. From this angle, his work provided a direct answer to Schafer, who 
through his action language had argued for ‘an ametaphorical theory’ (Schafer, 1975, p. 49).  
 Wurmser showed how Schafer’s theoretical construct was itself not free of metaphors: 
‘They may be paler, but they remain metaphors’ (Wurmser, 1977, p. 477). Wurmser adopted 
a Kantian perspective to argue that metaphors are indispensable for scientific generativity. A 
specificity of psychoanalytic metaphor would be their anthropomorphic dimension since the 
‘lawfulness of mental phenomena is by definition of “human form”’ (p. 494). Hence Freud’s 
energetic point of view that ‘has become the bugaboo of critics of metapsychology’ is, in 
Wurmser’s opinion, made of ‘perfectly acceptable metaphorical concepts, not only because 
they resemble so closely similar laws of relations in physics’ but also ‘because the very 
physical notions of “energy” and “quantity” are themselves of anthropomorphic origin’ (p. 
487). In Wurmser’s epistemological model, a metapsychology made of metaphors operates 
like mathematics for modern physics: its role would be to formalize and to integrate 
knowledge about our inner life. 
 Joseph Sandler’s article, ‘Reflections on Some Relations Between Psychoanalytic 
Concepts and Psychoanalytic Practice’, is partly an answer to George Klein’s attack on 
metapsychology. In this paper, Sandler stood up for the specificity of psychoanalytic practice 
based on metapsychology, but he nevertheless pointed to three concepts where ‘distance 
between theory on the one hand and clinical practice and experience on the other is 
particularly wide’ (Sandler, 1983, p. 42): 
 
1. Drives and motives: According to Sandler, not ‘all unconscious wishes derive from 
the instinctual drives.’ (p. 42) 
2. Conflict: Sandler takes over the criticism about the anthropomorphic aspect of 
metapsychology. 
3. Object relationship and transference.</NL> 
 
Later on, Sandler developed an idea that seems crucial, according to which each analyst has 
their own unconscious metapsychology: even ‘those who disdain explicit and formal 
theorizing develop, of necessity, their own personal (and to some extent idiosyncratic) inner 
sets of theories. They may be unaware of the existence of such theories or frame of reference, 
or be unable to verbalize them. […] Even the “purest” clinician has her theories about her 
patients’ (Sandler et al., 1997, p. 5, n.2). 
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 Amongst the supporters of metapsychology, I think it is crucial to mention the view of 
André Green. As Riccardo Steiner writes, Green sometimes evokes 
 
a solitary, worried biblical prophet, warrior, and defender of Freud’s work as he 
understands it, not so much to stick dogmatically to it, but to remind everybody, 
particularly at this moment in history, of the danger of forgetting the richness and still 
unsurpassed complexity of Freud’s inspirational model. (Steiner, 2000, p. 5)</EXT> 
 
Green reacted in the most radical way against what he perceived as the reduction of 
psychoanalytic theory. In addition, through Green, one can perceive how the 
metapsychological controversy triggered a series of debates in psychoanalytic research, 
including on the relevance of extra-clinical observation. 
 According to Green, the central debate in psychoanalytic research is metapsychology 
versus empirical research. Green attacks the idea that a theory of the unconscious could rest 
on empirical foundations: ‘Observation cannot tell us anything about intrapsychic processes 
that truly characterize the subject’s experience. Objectivism cannot be changed into 
subjectivism without denying what it wants to replace’ (Green, 2000, p. 60). He argues that 
many critics of Freud’s metapsychology fail to perceive the fundamental change between 
Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) and the breakthrough of The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900–1). The dream book inaugurated Freud’s metapsychological 
approach to thinking through psychic problems because the dream became a paradigm for 
psychoanalytic investigation (Green, 1979). The so-called scientific method seems to Green 
‘very unscientific because of its irrelevance to the object of psychoanalysis’ (Green, 2000, p. 
66). For that reason: ‘One must admit that a Shakespearean quotation can be more 
enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton of scientific literature!’ (Green, 2001, p. 19).  
 The interesting question is not so much whether Freud’s metapsychological 
speculations should be proved or disproved, but rather ‘what the connection is between his 
speculations […] and the central object of the discipline he created. What are the underlying 
epistemological problems that even he did not always spell out?’ (Green, 2000, p. 69). These 
epistemological problems stem from the specificity of the object of psychoanalytic research, 
which Green defines as the study of ‘the way the human mind functions in regard to its 
specific forms of disorganization’ (p. 68). Through a set of polysemic metaphors that refer to 
the analytical setting, the role of metapsychology would be to map and to make sense of 
those epistemological problems. 
 In the autumn of 1985, the bimestrial journal Revue Française de Psychanalyse 
published two issues under the title ‘Une crise de la métapsychologie’ (A Crisis of 
Metapsychology). I mention here two papers by Agnès Oppenheimer and Gilbert Diatkine 
that were written directly in reaction to the American controversy. Agnès Oppenheimer, in 
her paper ‘Qu’est ce que la métapsychologie?’ (What is Metapsychology?) argued that it was 
precisely because the discovery of unconscious processes undermines any philosophy of 
consciousness, which had constituted the epistemological horizon until Freud, that 
psychoanalytic questions should be formulated in a new framework and, according to her, 
metapsychology was this new epistemological framework (Oppenheimer, 1985, p. 1212). 
Oppenheimer defends the idea that metapsychology makes it possible to study psychological 
phenomena beyond the mind–body problem.  
 In his illuminating paper ‘L’Échafaudage et le bâtiment’ (The Scaffolding and the 
Edifice), Gilbert Diatkine stressed a view of metapsychology as a place for exploration. He 
described a ‘metapsychological attitude’ which he defined as the ability to ‘let hypotheses 
flow unhindered while maintaining one’s critical judgement’ (Diatkine, 1985, p. 1231). It is 
this metapsychological attitude that Freud adopted when he wrote: ‘What follows is 
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speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss 
according to his individual predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea 
consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead’ (Freud, 1920, p. 24). Diatkine pointed 
out the analogy between this attitude and free association. There is a parallel between the 
technique that produces the clinical material – free association – and the attitude that provides 
the ‘scaffolding’ of the psychoanalytical edifice: metapsychology. 
 Diatkine proposed a symptomatic reading of the American assault on 
metapsychology: in a similar way to some patients who experience a great difficulty in free 
associating, some analysts would have a sort of inaptitude to adopt a metapsychological 
attitude. They replace the fruitful tension between theory and speculation with a methodical 
hierarchy between a descriptive and an explanatory level of the theory. Diatkine attributed 
this rigidity to an idealization of an empirical model of science.  
 It is worth noticing that the enthusiastic adherence to such an ideal model of science 
seems to have renounced the question that Freud had addressed to Einstein: ‘It may perhaps 
seem to you as though our theories are a kind of mythology […] But does not every science 
come in the end to a kind of mythology like this?’ (Freud, 1933, p. 211). 
 
Conclusion: ‘Remaining a Prisoner in Order to Escape!’ 
In Louis Althusser’s moving autobiography The Future Lasts a Long Time, which is also an 
account of his analysis, he explains an escape plan he had conceived, while a prisoner of war 
in Germany during World War II: 
 
Having noticed that the Germans alerted all the police and troops within a very 
wide radius once they realised one of us had escaped, which usually resulted in the 
capture of the daring individual concerned, I decided the surest way of escaping 
would be to let them believe someone had escaped, wait until the general alert was 
over which never lasted more than three or four weeks, and then escape after that. 
What I therefore had to do was disappear from the camp […] and let them think I 
had gone, before actually going once the alert was past. To do this, I did not 
actually have to escape, but simply disappear, in other words hide within the camp 
itself (which was not impossible) and only then vanish into thin air, when all the 
measures adopted for the alert had been dropped […] In essence I had found a way 
of escaping from the camp without actually leaving and of remaining a prisoner in 
order to escape! (Althusser, 1993[1992], p. 108) 
 
Althusser never carried out his plan but he describes how the principle of remaining within an 
ideology in order to escape it would become a significant metaphor for his intellectual path. 
Freud’s metapsychology constitutes an endeavour similar to the one described by Althusser. 
In his metapsychological texts, Freud would describe models of the psyche that resist being 
systematized: they escape the jail of science from within models of the psychical apparatus. 
 From scientific articles to clinical cases, from papers on psychoanalytic technique 
addressed to his colleagues to more didactic papers intended for a larger audience, or from 
semi-autobiographical papers in which Freud presents his version of his intellectual path to 
papers of applied psychoanalysis – there is a great diversity of textual categories in Freud’s 
work. Amongst this wide range of ‘Freudian genres’, the metapsychological texts seem very 
different from the rest. As a reader of Freud’s work, one feels almost nervously that the 
metapsychological texts display a form of knowledge that operates in a very peculiar way. 
Jean-Claude Rolland describes with great accuracy this impression when he writes: 
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whoever reads with sustained attention any one of these papers [the 
metapsychological texts] soon discovers to what extent this speculation distances 
him from the clinical sphere, to the point of making him lose sight of it; but he also 
discovers how, behind the impeccable figuration Freud gives to this or that concept 
[…] thought comes to life in extravagance and luxury, a thought that I would say 
engages with its object more than just explaining it […] The writing in these papers 
is choppy, in turn advancing and retreating, sometimes abrupt as if it were not 
possible, for example, to elucidate the drive it speaks of except by submitting to its 
fits and starts and its violence […] 
  Unique writing, invocative more than evocative, calling for, demanding 
an equally unique reading founded on empathy, on the reader’s unconscious 
participation in the author’s unconscious. We do not read the metapsychological 
texts in the way we read Freud’s clinical cases or ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, 
not because they are more difficult because more abstract, would resist 
comprehension or committing to memory more vigorously, but because they 
compel the reader to confront the strangeness of what they bear witness to more 
than actually formulating it: strangeness of the melancholy colouring any 
identificatory movement of the ego, strangeness of the unconscious movements 
which shy away just as they show themselves, strangeness of the affect that, arising 
makes the ego oscillate between pain and pleasure. (Rolland, 2005, pp. 96–7) 
 
As suggested by Rolland, I believe that the ‘strangeness’ experienced by the reader of 
Freud’s metapsychological texts comes from the novelty of the objects they describe. It 
seems to me that the portraits of the unconscious drawn by Freud in these writings constitute 
the most subversive representation of the unconscious that is to be found in his work. Freud’s 
metapsychological notions of the unconscious are subversive because they put forward 
models that cannot be fully transcribed into pre-existing forms of intelligible discourses. It is 
a kind of epistemological subversion.  
 From his clinical material, Freud discovers psychical processes that cannot be 
explained through observation and induction and that cannot be understood though the 
interpretation of meanings. In Freud’s metapsychology, the dynamic unconscious is neither a 
positivist object of science nor an idealist metaphysical substance, and neither methods based 
on causality nor methods based on meaning can give an account of metapsychological 
unconscious processes. There is a rupture of the usual forms of rational discourse. 
 Fulfilling Freud’s prophecy about the destiny of psychoanalysis in the United States, 
the 1970s American critics resisted the forms of knowledge specific to a psychology of the 
unconscious. In the name of empirical evidence, or of a coherent theory of interpretation, 
they relocated the psyche within the walls of evidence-based science. Reductions of 
metapsychology to intentionality or its translation into empirical positivism share the 
common aim to introduce into the heart of psychoanalytic theory an informative subjectivity 
that could be apprehended as a set of data. That has consequences for the therapeutic practice 
of psychoanalysis since such models of the mind can fit in with a more normative clinic, be it 
the adaptive purpose of psychology or the technical standards of biological psychiatry. By 
challenging metapsychology, this generation of practitioners opened a breach that called into 
question the whole psychoanalytic edifice and, from within it, they escorted the general 
decline of psychoanalysis in North America. 
 The attempt to legitimize psychoanalytic knowledge and to demarcate it from 
theoretical models not directly linked to observation has persisted in Anglophone 
psychoanalysis beyond the time frame that I have studied here. An example of the aftermath 
of the American controversy is to be found in Luyten et al. (2006) who advocate a 
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methodological pluralism that would ‘bridge the gap’ between the two main psychoanalytic 
cultures: positivist and hermeneutic. In this attempt to pacify the ‘dispute on methods’ that 
the critical movement had transposed from nineteenth-century German epistemology to 
1970s psychoanalysis, they propose to establish psychoanalysis in a theoretical landscape that 
would combine intelligible discourses based on meaning and interpretation with an 
intelligibility based on causality and empiricism. However, they never consider the 
possibility that metapsychological discourse could be a form of intelligibility specific to 
psychoanalysis. 
  Another example is Mark Leffert who in his book published in 2010, Contemporary 
Psychoanalytic Foundations, has proposed ‘an interreferential schema which balances the 
influences of postmodernism, complexity theory and neuroscience as its key factors’ (Leffert, 
2010, p. 2). Leffert, who trained in the 1970s under the influence of the radical critics of the 
ego psychology school, resumes the epistemological examination of Freud’s metapsychology 
from a new angle. He argues that metapsychology rests on implicit ‘assumptions of 
knowability and predictability that are not ontologically sustainable’ (p. xi). Leffert tries to 
find in the combination of postmodernism, complexity and neuroscience a discourse on the 
limits of knowledge that would provide a better ground for psychoanalysis than 
metapsychology. 
 In their great diversity, all these proposals to rebuild the epistemological status of 
psychoanalysis converge on one point: that it is not possible to have an epistemology which 
is proper to psychoanalysis only. Each of these epistemological proposals is founded on 
models external to psychoanalysis – hence the necessity to attack Freud’s metapsychology, 
because in Freud’s mind the function of the metapsychological concepts was to offer a 
foundation specifically for psychoanalytic theory. In a footnote to ‘A Metapsychological 
Supplement to the Theory of Dreams’, Freud justifies his project to write his so-called 
metapsychological paper as a way to ‘clarify and carry deeper the theoretical assumptions on 
which a psycho-analytic system could be founded’ (Freud, 1915d, p. 222, n.1). 
 In the course of this paper, I tried to show how behind the 1970s challenge to 
metapsychology lay an attack on a sui generis epistemological status for psychoanalysis. 
However, the controversy ends up highlighting the epistemological subversion of Freud’s 
metapsychology: a theoretical scaffolding that locates speculation and phantasying at its core, 
and makes unifying labels or systemic classification intensely problematic. It is the belief in 
the existence of an essential relationship between Freud’s metapsychology and the specificity 
of the analytic cure that pushed psychoanalysts – mainly in France – to respond to the attacks 
from American analysts. This belief was summarized by Jean Laplanche when, about 20 
years after the beginning of the controversy, he observed: ‘One perceives to what extent only 
metapsychological considerations in their abstract forms are capable of appropriately centring 
what constitutes the essence of the psychoanalytic practice, Freud’s inaugural and primordial 
invention’ (Laplanche, 2007, p. 50, my translation). 
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This article explores the controversies triggered by Freud’s metapsychology, specifically the 
American critiques of the 1970s – Heinz Hartmann, Merton Gill and David Rapaport, Robert 
Waelder, and Lawrence Kubie for ego-psychology, leading into Roy Schafer, George Klein 
and again Merton Gill for hermeneutics, Emmanuel Peterfreund and Charles Brenner for 
positivism, before concluding with a summary of more inventive engagements with 
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metapsychology including that of Joseph Sandler and André Green. The article argues that in 
the name of empirical or clinical evidence, the American critiques tried to reintroduce a 
subjectivity made of data into the heart of psychoanalytic theory and as a result, replaced the 
subject of the unconscious with a new figure of the subject not only transparent to itself, but 
also transparent to two main forms of discourse: the hermeneutic discourse, on the one hand, 
and the positivist discourse, on the other. 
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